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ABSTRACT 
 The conflict between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran is also a conflict of narratives. Influence professionals in the United States 
government must understand narrative structure and how it functions in society because 
narrative is an essential building block of human existence. Moreover, to enhance the 
influence that a narrative approach can provide, influence professionals must also 
understand the basic conceptual frameworks of justice. An understanding of justice not 
only provides a means of resolution for conflict within narrative, it also helps further the 
understanding of the narratives of a target audience. Through an in-depth understanding 
and appreciation of the narratives and concepts of justice in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
influence professionals can craft and perform more effective engagements as a part of 
greater governmental efforts. 
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The conflict between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is 
also a conflict of narratives.1 In other words, it is a competition of influence.2 Harnessing 
the power of and expertly employing narrative can help the U.S. government achieve its 
policy goals in wartime, peacetime, and in all the graduated levels of conflict in-between.3 
Moral and political philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre posited that “man is in his actions and 
practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal.”4 Political scientists 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt discuss the importance of narrative by offering, “what 
may especially matter for all parties—the advocates and their audience—is the ‘story’ that 
is being told, implicitly or explicitly.”5 They further validate narrative in the emergence of 
integrating information strategy to achieve goals, arguing that success “may ultimately be 
about whose story wins.”6 Moreover, neuroscientist Paul Zak discusses the importance of 
crafting compelling narratives by noting that “attention is a scarce neural resource because 
it is metabolically costly to a brain that needs to conserve resources. If a story does not 
sustain our attention, then the brain will look for something else more interesting to do.”7 
Therefore, understanding narrative is critical to achieving policy goals because it is a 
central element of human existence. 
                                                 
1 Narrative is discussed in-depth in Chapter II of this thesis. Unless specifically noted, narrative, story, 
and discourse will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis.  
2 Influence as in having the power to affect “the behavior of others to get the outcomes one wants.” 
Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 2. 
3 All levels of conflict in-between peacetime and wartime means there is a conflict but there is no 
formal declaration of war between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
4 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2 ed., reprint (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 216. 
5 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American 
Information Strategy, MR/RAND OSD 1033 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 53, https://www.rand.org/
pubs/monograph_reports/MR1033.html. 
6 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 53. 
7 Paul J. Zak, “Why Inspiring Stories Make Us React: The Neuroscience of Narrative,” Cerebrum: The 
Dana Forum on Brain Science (February 2015): 6. 
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There is an essential concept that demands special attention from those who would 
employ narrative: justice. Invoking Aristotle and Augustine, philosopher Paul Ricoeur 
described justice as “a lived experience where discordance rends concordance.”8 Narrative, 
he explained, is a “verbal experience where concordance mends discordance.”9 In other 
words, narrative remedies the tensions created by living life. This thesis asserts that the 
method in which a resolution of tension is rendered will have an effect on whether or not a 
target audience of U.S. government–generated narrative will likely be accepted or not. This 
acceptance is what invokes justice as a core concept in narrative. Invoking concepts that 
are already familiar to a target audience strengthens the effectiveness of the narrative. 
Social psychologist Leon Festinger proposed if the information given does not fall into the 
person’s already developed mental model of the world, it may be rejected.10 As applied to 
narrative conflict, the U.S. government’s narrative will not be accepted by the target 
audience if said audience cannot see and embody itself within the U.S. government’s 
narrative. Therefore, a study of the target audience’s concepts of justice will assist in the 
acceptance of the resolution of tension in narrative and thus help formulate a narrative that 
will be accepted by a target audience and assist in achieving the objectives of the U.S. 
government. This chapter introduces the perspective taken in this thesis by an information 
operations professional and outlines the background of the conflict between the United 
States and the IRI. 
A. AN INFORMATION OPERATIONS PERSPECTIVE 
Information operations is defined in the Information Operations (Joint Publication 
[JP] 3-13) as “the integrated employment, during military operations, of information 
related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or 
usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our 
                                                 
8 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Vol. I, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1990), 31. 
9 Ricoeur, 31. 
10 Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
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own.”11 In the same publication, information-related capabilities are defined as “the tools, 
techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information 
environment.”12 When both definitions are taken together, information operations, in other 
words, is the integration, coordination, and synchronization of information-related 
capabilities into military operations to cause someone or something to take an action(s) (or 
no action [s]) that is advantageous for the military to accomplish its objectives. It is the 
role of the information operations officer to enhance the military commander’s influence 
to accomplish their objectives. Moreover, as military objectives are accomplished, the 
policy goals of the U.S. government are closer to being fulfilled. 
Information operations officers assist in enhancing the influence of the military 
commander; they can also be described as influence professionals. As influence 
professionals with counterparts in other branches of government, the ideas put forth in this 
thesis transcend military operations and should be expanded to any government actor who 
is in the position to influence the outcome of government policy objectives. Additionally, 
wielding influence is rarely a single government entity’s task. Within the whole-of-
government approach, integration, coordination, and synchronization of tools, techniques, 
or activities that produce information is an effort that spans across governmental 
departments. The term “influence professional” is used throughout the thesis to recognize 
the argument of this research is not bounded to a military construct. Any influence 
professional has the ability to affect outcomes with the arguments given, assuming the 
required government authorities and permissions are granted. 
Narrative is the most important information-related capability that an influence 
professional can employ to achieve the government’s objectives. Seemingly for an 
adversary or enemy, the sentiment remains true. As Thomas Johnson, the director of the 
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, illustrated in 
his book Taliban Narratives, if an adversary or enemy is more effective at employing 
                                                 
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, JP 3-13 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014), ix. 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, x. The three dimensions of the information environment are the physical, 
informational, and cognitive dimensions. 
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narrative, then the government’s objectives have a distinct possibility of not being 
accomplished.13 Narrative is defined in depth in Chapter II; however, as a mechanism of 
influence, its ultimate effect manifests within the cognitive dimension. Commander’s 
Communication Synchronization (Joint Doctrine Note 2–13) emphasizes “the cognitive 
dimension is complex, adaptive, and more difficult to understand than closed systems. This 
is a complex undertaking, complicated by factors such as the public’s preexisting bias, 
cultural lens, stimulus response patterns, motivation, expectations, and view of the 
situation.”14 Utilizing narrative can help the influence professional to tame and organize 
the complexity of the cognitive dimension.15 This makes narrative an invaluable tool of 
influence. 
In an effort to enhance influence, the influence professional must understand 
narrative structure and how it functions. Equally important, the influence professional must 
understand basic conceptual frameworks of justice. By examining the conflict between the 
United States and the IRI, this thesis furthers the understanding of narrative and justice 
conceptual frameworks. Rather than proposing a narrative or set of narratives that should 
be employed in the conflict, this thesis provides a baseline of narrative theory and types of 
justice that might be embodied when developing narrative to accomplish policy objectives. 
It enables influence professionals to conceptualize the framework for narrative needed in 
each unique circumstance of government policy accomplishment. To start the 
conceptualization, the background of the conflict between the United States and the IRI is 
outlined in the next section. 
B. CONFLICT BACKGROUND: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
The conflict between the United States and the IRI began almost immediately after 
the inception of the IRI. Eight months later, on November 4, 1979, Iranian students seized 
                                                 
13 Thomas H. Johnson, Taliban Narratives: The Use and Power of Stories in the Afghanistan Conflict 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 266–67. 
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander’s Communication Synchronization, Joint Doctrine Note 2–13 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013), III-14. 
15 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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the U.S. Embassy. This event, as Middle East analyst and political scientist Kenneth 
Katzman stated, is when “relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic 
turned openly hostile.”16 Since then, the United States and the Islamic Republic have not 
experienced rapprochement; “Iran has since its revolution pursued policies that every 
successive U.S. Administration has considered inimical to U.S. interests in the Near East 
region and beyond.”17 Additionally, the 2017 National Security Strategy described the 
Islamic Republic as “the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism.”18 However, there 
have been multiple attempts to resume traditional diplomatic relations and move to end the 
conflict that began in 1979. Katzman noted that as of October 2019, different U.S. 
government administrations have either moved toward or away from rapprochement with 
the government of the Islamic Republic, with all efforts resulting in still no formal 
diplomatic relations between the two governments.19  
Enduring conflict with Iran is not a foregone conclusion; there is common ground 
between the populations of both countries. Former Secretary of State Madeleine K. 
Albright, commenting on the relationship between the American and Iranian people, 
remarked, “there is much common ground between our two peoples. Both are idealist, 
proud, family-oriented, spiritually aware and fiercely opposed to foreign domination.”20 
The following section is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the conflict 
between the United States and the IRI; however, it is a brief overview of the contributing 
factors that have kept the conflict alive for the past forty years. 
The United States’ interests in Iran did not take shape until after World War II, 
when the United Kingdom began to cede spheres of influence over Iran. The United States 
                                                 
16 Kenneth Katzman, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, CRS Report No. RL32048 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 22, 2019), 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/RL/RL32048. 
17 Katzman, 17. 
18 White House, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 49, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
19 Katzman, “Iran,” 17–23. 
20 Madeleine K. Albright, “Remarks before the American-Iranian Council”, U.S. Department of State, 
March 17, 2000, https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/2000/000317.html. 
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supported the government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi because, as Katzman stated, 
the United States “viewed his government as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet 
influence in the Persian Gulf and a counterweight to pro-Soviet Arab regimes and 
movements.”21 In 1953, the contestation of governmental policies between the shah and 
then Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq led to the shah leaving the country. Dr. 
Mossadeq’s policy to nationalize the oil industry and left-leaning politics gave the U.S. 
government concern and led to the restoration of the shah in a coup d’état supported by the 
United States’ Central Intelligence Agency.22 This action by the U.S. government breathed 
air into the future conflict between the United States and the IRI. Former Secretary Albright 
commented, “it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention 
by America in their internal affairs.”23 She further commented on the actions of the United 
States, which “believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was 
clearly a setback for Iran’s political development.”24 Katzman proposed that, once back in 
power, the shah “alienated the Shiite clergy and religious Iranians … incurred broader 
resentment by using his … intelligence service to repress dissent.”25 These actions sowed 
the seeds for revolution in Iran as well as cemented the call for the shah to face justice after 
the establishment of the IRI. Historian Roham Alvandi stated that the United States’ 
decision to admit the shah into the country and essentially deny the IRI’s call for justice 
was the spark that flared the conflict between the two countries.26 As United States 
Institute of Peace researcher John Caves explained, the United States “allowed the deposed 
Shah into the United States for cancer treatment. In protest, Iranian students … seized the 
U.S. Embassy and took 52 Americans hostage.”27 
                                                 
21 Katzman, “Iran,” 1. 
22 Katzman, 1. 
23 Albright, “Remarks before the American-Iranian Council.” 
24 Albright. 
25 Katzman, “Iran,” 1. 
26 Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 2–3. 
27 John Caves III, “U.S.-Iran: History of Overtures and Confrontations,” The Iran Primer,” May 22, 
2019, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2019/may/22/us-iran-overtures-and-confrontations. 
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Further deepening the conflict in the 1980s, as Katzman added, was the bombing 
of the Marine Barracks in Beirut, which led the Reagan administration to designate the IRI 
as a state sponsor of terrorism.28 Despite this action, Caves noted, the parliamentary 
speaker of the IRI reached out to the United States in an effort to restore relations. However, 
once the Iran-Contra affair was exposed, “high-level contacts between Tehran and 
Washington subsided.”29 Katzman commented on actions in the late 1980s in which there 
were several naval engagements between the United States and the IRI during the Iran-Iraq 
War, where “Iran lost one-quarter of its larger naval ships,” and the subsequent downing 
of Iran Air Flight 655, which a U.S. naval vessel mistakenly engaged, resulting in the death 
of all 290 on board.30 
In a step toward resolving the conflict between the United States and the IRI, 
President Bush, as Katzman wrote, “implied that U.S.-Iran relations could improve if Iran 
obtains the release of U.S. hostages held by Hezbollah in Lebanon.”31 In his inaugural 
address, President Bush said, “there are today Americans who are held against their will in 
foreign land, and Americans who are unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here, and 
will be long remembered. Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that 
endlessly moves on.”32 Caves offered that, in response to President Bush’s message, the 
Islamic Republic Rafsanjani intervened to free the hostages.33 Katzman noted, “however, 
no U.S.-Iran thaw followed, possibly because Iran continued to back violent groups 
opposed to the U.S. push for Arab-Israeli peace.”34 
The IRI’s continued support for terrorist groups continued to widen the gap for 
conflict resolution. Iran scholar Trita Parsi contextualized the Islamic Republic’s behavior 
                                                 
28 Katzman, “Iran,” 18. The perception that Iran was involved in the bombing led the administration to 
add Iran to the state sponsor of terrorism list. 
29 Caves, “U.S.-Iran.” 
30 Katzman, “Iran,” 18. 
31 Katzman, 18. 
32 George Bush, “Inaugural Address of George Bush,” Yale University, January 20, 1989, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/bush.asp. 
33 Caves, “U.S.-Iran.” 
34 Katzman, “Iran,” 18. 
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by explaining that “the Iranian response was aimed at undermining the Oslo process itself 
since the perception was that an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord and Iran’s isolation went 
and hand.”35 In response, as Katzman noted that, “in 1995–1996 the [Clinton] 
administration and Congress banned U.S. trade and investment with Iran … in response to 
Iran’s support for terrorist groups seeking to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process.”36 Caves noted that beyond support for terrorist groups in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process, the United States blamed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard for the bombing 
of the U.S. Air Force housing complex in 1996.37 However, despite events that could have 
deepened the conflict between the nations, both sides called for talks and a pathway for 
relations. Caves observed that the United States and the IRI cooperated during the U.S. 
military actions in Afghanistan by sharing intelligence and assisting in creating 
Afghanistan’s new government.38 
In yet another setback to relations and conflict resolution, Katzman reminded us 
that President George W. Bush “in his January 2002 State of the Union message … named 
Iran as part of an ‘axis of evil’ including Iraq and North Korea.”39 This comment by 
President Bush is an example of how narratives between countries can be set awry through 
specific actions or even through discourse. By calling the IRI evil, President Bush ended 
any narrative of relationship building with the IRI. During this time, Katzman added, Iran’s 
nuclear program began to advance and the United States “worked with several European 
countries to persuade Iran to agree to limit its nuclear program.”40 From then on, the 
Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and its sponsorship of terrorism have remained the 
central points to the conflict with the United States.41 
                                                 
35 Trita Parsi, Iran in the 21st Century: Politics, Economics & Conflict, ed. Homa Katouzian and 
Hossein Shahidi (Routledge, 2007), 150, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203939772. 
36 Katzman, “Iran,” 18. 
37 Caves, “U.S.-Iran.” 
38 Caves. 
39 Katzman, “Iran,” 19 
40 Katzman, 19 
41 Katzman, 19–23. 
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President Obama offered a path for beginning talks and taking a step toward conflict 
resolution.42 Katzman noted President Obama’s “shift to a ‘two-track’ strategy: stronger 
economic pressure coupled with offers of negotiations that could produce sanctions 
reliefs.”43 This strategy resulted in the presidents of both countries speaking by phone for 
the first time since Iran’s revolution.44 The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action was a mixed result of whether or not it would lead to improved relations between 
the United States and the Islamic Republic. Katzman reminded us that President Obama 
asserted, “that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would benefit the U.S. national 
security without a broader rapprochement.”45 
But, of course, the United States has since withdrawn from the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action and imposed a policy of maximum pressure on the Islamic 
Republic to, as Katzman wrote, “compel it to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action to address the broad range of U.S. concerns and deny Iran the revenue to continue 
to develop its strategic capabilities or intervene through the region.”46 Katzman stated that 
the demands imposed on the Islamic Republic by President Trump’s administration “would 
strike at the core of Iran’s revolution and are unlikely to be met by Iran.”47 Talks to 
improve relations and build toward conflict resolution have not taken place as of October 
2019. While items that have fueled the conflict, such as the taking of hostages, have been 
resolved, the conflict continues due to competing national interests and an unwillingness 
to cede ground in brinkmanship. Perhaps, then, integrating concepts of justice in narrative 
engagement with the IRI can influence the country to further engage in relations and 
conflict resolution with the United States. 
                                                 
42 President Obama’s diplomatic engagement with Iran was motivated by a concern for what Israel’s 
response may be if Iran was able to have the capability to or produce a nuclear weapon and how a nuclear 
weapon could affect regional stability; Alon Ben-Meir, “Israel’s Response to a Nuclear Iran,” International 
Journal on World Peace 27, no. 1 (2010): 61–78. 
43 Katzman, “Iran,” 19. 
44 Katzman, 20. 
45 Katzman, 20. 
46 Katzman, 21. 
47 Katzman, 24. 
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This thesis explores the building blocks needed to begin to execute that strategy. 
Chapter II offers a deep dive into what a narrative is, its components, and how it is involved 
in meaning-making, identity, and goal formation. Chapter III discusses basic concepts of 
justice and how they apply to narrative creation and communication. Chapter IV engages 
in a possible conception of what Iranian narratives of justice are. Finally, Chapter V offers 
concluding thoughts on the implication and application of narrative and justice. 
11 
II. THE CENTRALITY OF NARRATIVE IN OUR LIVES 
Narrative is central to the phenomenon of human existence. Literary theorist 
Roland Barthes wrote, “narrative is present at all times, in all places, in all societies; the 
history of narrative begins with the history of mankind; there does not exist, and never has 
existed a people without narratives.”48 Sociologist Laurel Richardson affirmed, “narrative 
displays the goals and intention of human actors; it makes individual, cultures, societies, 
and historical epochs comprehensible as wholes; it humanizes time; and it allows us to 
contemplate the effects of our actions, and to alter the directions of our lives.”49 
Consequently, narrative is central to military operations because all military operations, in 
their simplest form, are interactions between humans. Narrative remains a component of 
military operations, whether it is acknowledged and operationalized or dismissed and 
becomes a vulnerability. The U.S. military offers many catchphrases that attempt to draw 
attention to the importance of narrative. Some examples include “get ahead of the 
narrative,” “counter the narrative,” “provide an alternate narrative,” or “this a battle of 
narratives.” While these phrases may have been useful in their singular context, they may 
also have been equally unsuited for the military objectives that needed to be achieved. 
Military strategist Bernard Brodie argued that “good strategy presumes good anthropology 
and sociology. Some of the greatest military blunders of all time have resulted from a 
juvenile evaluation in this department.”50 This thesis augments Brodie’s argument to say, 
to presume good anthropology, sociology, and an understanding of narrative and justice. 
Narrative in the U.S. military is not formally defined.51 Multiple Joint Publications 
mention the importance of narrative, as well as narrative being prose used as an internal 
                                                 
48 Roland Barthes, “Introduction to the Structural Analysis of the Narrative” (discussion paper, 
Birmingham, AUK: University of Birmingham, 1966), 1, http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/2961/. 
49 Laurel Richardson, “Narrative and Sociology,” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 19, no. 1 
(1990): 117, https://doi.org/10.1177/089124190019001006. 
50 Bernard Brodie, War and Politics. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 332. 
51 There is no formal definition in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms 2019 or the United States Government Compendium of Interagency and Associated Term 2018 
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staff synchronization tool.52 The closest the Department of Defense comes to defining 
narrative is in the Public Affairs Joint Publication: “a narrative is a short story used to 
underpin operation and provide greater understanding and context to an operation or 
situation.”53 This, as we will see later in the chapter, is not a bad attempt at defining 
narrative; however, immediately on the next page the joint publication quotes Michael 
Vlahos, stating that “in war, narrative is much more than just a story.”54 Furthering the 
ambiguity in what is narrative, Joint Doctrine Note 2–13, Commander’s Communication 
Synchronization, states that narrative is an “overarching expression of context and desired 
results.”55 These ambiguous and at times contradictory meanings of narrative highlights 
the need for the military to understand and harness the power of narrative to give tactical, 
operational, and strategic advantage to commanders. 
This chapter focuses on the components of narrative, how narrative makes meaning, 
forms identity, and contributes to goal formation and shared outcomes. 
A. NARRATIVE COMPONENTS 
To better understand how narrative functions in human society, we first must 
understand what narrative is. According to American literary thinker Jonathan Culler, a 
narrative is composed of two distinct parts: the story and the discourse. The story consists 
of an event or events and the discourse consists of the presentation of events in discursive 
form.56 According to English scholar H. Porter Abbott, narrative theorists employ different 
words for story and discourse such as fabula and sjuzet, respectively, but ultimately, the 
different terminology overlaps, and the core concepts of story and discourse remain.57 
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Defining the narrative components matters because when employing narrative in military 
operations it must be clear to military staff and commanders which element or elements 
are being acted upon. The U.S. military does not always have control of the story, but the 
opportunity to contribute a discourse in response to the story always remains a possibility. 
Whether or not the means exist for a discourse to reach a target audience is not addressed 
in this paper.  
The story (events or actions) can be divided into two other elements: the events and 
the entities.58 Abbott wrote about the relationship between events and entities by asking, 
“What are events but the actions or reactions of entities?”59 Abbott acknowledged that it 
is possible to have entities without events; however, for the purposes of narrative in this 
paper, entities will have always enacted some event. The ability to enact events leads to 
the argument for agency of entities discussed later in this chapter. 
English scholar Matthew Garrett holds that discourse gives the story meaning.60 It 
arranges the sequence of events in time and space and provides the necessary context to 
understand what is happening and why. Discourse can be an internal monologue or 
transmitted through a medium. How the discourse is transmitted can significantly affect 
how it is received by its target audience. Umberto Eco, a literary critic and philosopher, 
stated although the discourse is transmitted through a medium, the receiver has a role to 
play in making the discourse’s meaning and the level of effectiveness in the transmission 
of the author’s intentions.61 Discussion on discourse can undoubtedly continue; however, 
it is critical to understand, as Abbott wrote, that “story is always mediated (constructed) by 
narrative discourse. We are always called upon to be active participants in narrative, 
because receiving the story depends on how we, in turn, construct it from discourse.”62 
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According to philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault, discourse creates and 
maintains reality.63 Understanding the relationship between discourse and reality is an 
essential key to successful military operations because humans act upon the reality they 
perceive. While information and influence professionals should embrace and further 
research distinctions within the components of narrative, for this thesis, terminologically 
speaking, “narrative,” “discourse,” and “story” will be used interchangeably at times for 
ease of communication. 
Understanding components of a narrative matters because the right concepts and 
components need to be utilized to foster narrative. For example, narrative comprises story 
and discourse, not ideas and discourse. Defense analyst and narrative strategist Ajit Maan 
wrote, “the simplest form of an idea is an assertion … it is not narrative itself. The narrative 
lies in the assignment of motivation and meaning to all the events.”64 As military 
information and influence professionals, we must search for the events and actions (story) 
and fully understand the related discourse and not chase the ideas that are a result of 
narrative. Maan asserts, “often ideas inform narratives—the most influential ideas are 
presented in narrative form. But more fundamentally, narrative forms our ideas.”65 
Information and influence professionals must seek the story and discourse to understand 
fully the narrative or narratives at play. 
B. MEANING-MAKING 
Understanding narrative and its inexorable role in meaning-making is an integral 
part of U.S. military actions. The military conducts its actions within the operational 
environment.66 Co-existing with the operational environment is the information 
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environment, which together “are interdependent and integral.”67 According to JP 3-13, 
Information Operations, the information environment is “the aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This 
environment consists of three interrelated dimensions … the physical, informational, and 
cognitive.”68 In the cognitive dimension, the military can focus actions to affect 
“individuals’ or groups’ information processing, perception, judgment, and decision 
making.”69 Therefore, how the human mind processes information and makes meaning out 
of information is a significant factor in military operations. In search of an explanation of 
how information is made into meaning in the human mind, this thesis turns to narrative. 
The process of using narrative to make meaning is a human universal cognitive 
process. Political scientist Ronald Krebs stated that “the impulse to narrative is universal, 
across humankind and human history. Narratives are essential to how human beings make 
meaning, to how they make sense of, and order, messy experience.”70 Psychologists Dan 
McAdams and Kate Mclean ‘agree: “human beings are natural storytellers … stories are 
told or performed in every known human culture.”71 The universality of narrative gives it 
value for understanding and applies narrative tenets to shape meaning. Even though 
meaning-making is an internal process, it relies upon external factors from which to receive 
information. As information and influence professionals begin to examine the maps of the 
cognitive dimension in a given area, the narrative meaning-making process must be 
acknowledged as the way in which a given audience will interpret the information it is 
presented.  
Cognitive processes should hold a place of great importance for military planners. 
Narrative, as psychologist Donald Polkinghorne emphasized, is “the primary form by 
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which human experience is made meaningful.”72 For Polkinghorne, meaning-making is an 
activity that consists of connecting a series of events, bounded by time, to understand how 
those events contribute to an outcome, and then, understanding how that outcome is a part 
of an entire episode.73 Therefore, narrative as a cognitive process should be fully 
understood to be able to exert influence on a target audience. Polkinghorne continued, 
“narrative meaning is a cognitive process that organizes human experience into temporally 
meaningful episodes.”74 Without understanding how target audiences arrange and interpret 
events in their minds, we cannot understand what information the target audience needs to 
interpret events in a manner advantageous to military and government policy objectives. 
Thus, the desired behavior of a target audience can be influenced by embracing and 
manipulating how humans use narrative to create meaning. 
Meaning and truth are not synonymous when applying a narrative framework. 
Maan stated that “narratives are successful or not, interesting or not, influential or not, but 
narratives do not rely upon truth-value for their success.”75 When the narrative is created 
to make meaning, the credibility of the creator is a more significant factor than whether the 
narrative is based in truth.76 That is to say, when giving a choice between competing 
narratives of meaning, the narrative that resonates the most is the one that best fits within 
the cognitive basis of the audience.77 Moreover, Krebs affirmed, “all stories are necessarily 
fictional, in the sense that they level out the jagged discontinuities of human experience in 
favor of coherence.”78 A discussion on truth is outside the scope of this thesis; however, it 
is important draw the difference between discovering truth and the formation of meaning 
through narrative. 
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Organizing time is especially important for making meaning, because it allows for 
events to be placed in relation to one another and thus, their sequence in relation to other 
sequences of events are then made meaningful. If we revisit the breakdown of narrative 
into story and discussion, we can see the importance of time in narrative. For Abbott, the 
story must proceed in chronological order, but in discourse, the creator can recount the 
story in any temporal order they choose.79 As the audience receives the narrative, its 
members go through a mental process that gives meaning to the story, the discourse, and 
the time, which then places that meaning within a greater meaning that already exists within 
their cognitive structure.80 Krebs wrote that “narratives cast that temporal ordering as 
meaningfully structured: the first event did not merely occur before the second, but was a 
cause of the second.”81 As Maan affirmed, “narrative bestows meaning on what were 
previously just a series of events that are sometimes related and sometimes not related. It 
ties together events in a certain way for a certain purpose.”82 In other words, humans use 
narrative to navigate their existence by creating meaning through time from the sequencing 
of events. As humans make meaning of the world around them, they must also make sense 
of themselves. This thesis now examines the role of narrative in the formation of identity. 
C. IDENTITY FORMATION 
Humans use narrative to create and maintain their identity. McAdams and McLean 
discussed narrative identity as an internally constructed story about oneself. This story 
addresses the individual past, present, and future to provide unity and purpose to life.83 
McAdams and McLean stated, “people construct and share stories about themselves … 
detailing particular episodes and periods in their lives and what those experiences mean to 
them. Out of the episodic particular of autobiographical memory, a person may construct 
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and internalize and evolving and integrative story for life.”84 Ricoeur furthered the notion 
of narrative and identity by stating, “narrative constructs the durable character of an 
individual.”85 From examining the actions of the character of an individual, an identity 
emergences and answers the question, Who am I?86 
The narratives used to create identity do not start from a blank slate. Sociologist 
Joseph Davis wrote that identity narrative is “influenced and structured by many types of 
preexisting narratives, from cultural myths to the stories of one’s family.”87 The narrative 
of self-identity is in constant interaction with internal and external factors.88 Sociologist 
Douglas Ezzy wrote, “narrative identities are formed in a complex interaction between 
events, imagination, significant others, routines and habits, and the structure of the 
soliloquy that forms a person’s self-narrative.”89 This interaction is mediated by moral 
space. Davis wrote, “moral space is a realm of questions about what is good, what is 
worthwhile, and what has meaning … identity cannot be detached from the individual 
beliefs about what things have significance … from his or her fundamental evaluation with 
regard to questions of the good in life.”90 The next chapter introduces the concept of justice 
and its role in mediating the outcomes and selection of narratives. Identity is formed 
through an individual mediation of all available narratives, including their own, and 
choosing which aspects fit their identity. An individual’s story is inescapable from the 
stories surrounding them. 
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Different individuals in different circumstances will place more or less emphasis 
on narratives depending upon which narratives they see themselves in. As Davis wrote, 
“identity is not some inner essence but rather an ongoing story that emerges in and through 
the selection and emplotment of experience.”91 According to McAdams and McLean, this 
sorting process depends upon the level of agency the individual has assigned to his or her 
self.92 Krebs emphasized the importance of agency: “narratives are also populated by 
characters, agents who act, who are acted upon, and who react to the world around them.”93 
Individuals are agents in their narrative not just in the resulting action from the narrative 
but in the selection of the narratives they internalize. However, the level of narrative 
selection choice is dependent upon the individual. Davis explained that we, “culturally and 
institutionally embedded narrative with which we identify, then shape the construction of 
our self-story.”94 While humans are actors who behave according to their identity; internal 
and external narratives play a fundamental role in the individual’s identity. 
Beyond choosing which narratives individuals see themselves in, philosopher 
Galen Strawson believes that people may place differing emphasis on whether they see 
their lives in narrative form.95 Strawson argued that some people do not see their lives as 
a coherent narrative; their past selves do not factor into their future selves, they only exist 
in the moment of time that is being examined, which he referred to as “episodic.”96 
Philosopher Peter Goldie offered that people can utilize narrative in their lives in a variety 
of ways. If one sees events in an episodic manner, those episodes still have narratives, 
although the narratives are much more restricted by time.97 The significance of the 
synthesis of these two thoughts about narrative is there must be a recognition that a target 
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audience’s past, present, and future might matter more or less to it depending on how the 
audience members see themselves in the world. Target audiences that place more 
importance on a coherent story building from its members’ past will require that 
information when assimilating a new narrative. On the other hand, if they are focused in 
the current movement, information about their past or their future will be disregarded 
because they do not see that information as important. Maan offered an alternative to 
Strawson by discussing other dimensions that might hold a narrative’s continuity together 
other than time.98 With this assertion, it is not only important to understand the emphasis 
a target audience places on narrative but it is also just as important to understand what 
aspects by which a target audience arranges its narrative, for example, arranging narrative 
can happen through a memory, spatial, or conceptual organization.99 In other words, 
humans do not experience and do not create narratives in a uniform manner. Discussion of 
this topic is beyond the scope of thesis; however, for the narrative creator examining how 
a target audience arranges information even in a narrative structure is an essential task for 
narrative creation. 
D. GOAL FORMATION 
Narrative plays an essential role in human existence, meaning-making, and identity 
formation. This section converges those concepts into how narrative informs goals. Maan 
wrote, “Through narrative we co-construct our personal and cultural identities. Ideas and 
beliefs result from those identities, and actions follow.”100 Those actions will ultimately 
lead to a goal that was envisioned from narrative. In other words, understanding narrative 
will give insight to likely behaviors an individual or a group will enact. As McAdams and 
McLean noted previously, narrative addresses the future of identity.101 MacIntyre 
furthered the connection between narrative and behavior: 
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I can only answer the question, “What am I to do?” if I can answer the prior 
question “Of what story or stories do I find myself a part of?” We enter 
society, that is, with one or more imputed characters—roles into which we 
have been drafted—and we have to learn what they are in order to be able 
to understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are 
apt to be constructed.102 
The question Who am I, can be answered in narrative, as well as the question, Who 
am I to become. According to Polkinghorne, narrative moves in an episodic fashion from 
one outcome to another.103 Furthermore, cognitive psychologist Roger Schank discussed, 
the narrative is a script that can be read because the behavior within the script can be 
predicted.104 Then with an integral understanding of a story, the next outcome can be 
hypothesized. MacIntrye visited this notion by discussing that the behaviors humans 
engage in cannot be separated from why that behavior is taking place. He offered that by 
understanding the narrative that is in play, the intentions of the behavior can be realized.105 
Thus, understanding narrative assists in understanding behavior the individual will engage 
in when moving from one episode within a narrative to another. 
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III. NARRATIVES OF JUSTICE  
Within the structure of narrative, there is a theme that replicates narrative’s 
centrality to human existence. This thesis proposes that theme is justice. Psychologists John 
Ellard, Annelie Harvey, and Mitchell Callan remarked, “the centrality of the belief and 
resulting need for justice is essentially existential.”106 Additionally, legal scholar Teresa 
Philips connected narrative and justice by arguing that, as narrative is being employed, 
justice is being enacted.107 As mentioned in Chapter I, in all human interaction, there is an 
element of tension. The level of tension in an interaction can span the spectrum from utterly 
negligible to undeniably significant. As events unfold and narrative discourses overlap 
between humans, the acceptance of the resolution or continuation of tension is driven by 
justice. Ellard, Harvey, and Callan stressed, “this perspective emphasizes the extent to 
which justice is a central organization theme in people’s life that manifests itself in the 
many and varied ways people demonstrate a need to believe in a just world, where not only 
they but also others get what they deserve.”108 Furthermore, sociologist Ronald Jacobs 
argued narrative “influences social outcomes because of the way it informs competing 
expectations.”109 In other words, the theme of justice in a narrative and how tension is 
resolved are powerful tools of influence. Anthropologist Laura Nader added to the 
universality of justice by illustrating that “ideas as to what is considered just and unjust are 
found embedded in every aspect of culture and personality.”110 Thus, justice should be 
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carefully examined and shrewdly employed by the military and government to achieve 
their objectives. 
Justice can take many forms and has just as many advocates as adversaries for each 
form. Political philosopher Michael Sandel argued that there are three approaches to justice 
that determine how a society decides to give each person their due. His three approaches 
are “welfare, freedom, and virtue.”111 Whichever approach a society decides to use will 
affect how justice is enacted. Sandel discussed the different approaches by noting that 
justice based in virtue means defining what is the most ideal way to live life and then 
determining what actions are just based upon the ideal life. Sandel invoked Aristotle by 
offering, “in order to determine who deserves what, we have to determine what virtues are 
worthy of honor and reward.”112 On the other hand, the notion of freedom over virtue, as 
Sandel argued, means every individual can choose which life is the most ideal life to live. 
Here, Sandel invokes Immanuel Kant and John Rawls by noting that they argued, “the 
principles of justice that define our rights should not rest on any particular conception of 
virtue … a just society respects each person’s freedom to choose his or her own conception 
of the good life.”113 Finally, Sandel discussed what welfare is by invoking the 
utilitarianism concept of welfare, or in other words “how and why we should maximize 
welfare, or (as the utilitarians put it) seek the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number.”114 A deeper analysis of these three approaches to justice are beyond the scope 
of this thesis, though it is important to conceptualize that notions and approaches to justice 
are fluid and applying frameworks of justice requires a specific knowledge of 
circumstance. 
This chapter examines specific and differing concepts within justice and the notion 
of deserts to raise the effectiveness and efficiency of narratives created by the U.S. 
government and military. In agreement with political theorist David Miller, this thesis 
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accepts two conceptual frameworks. First, justice is relative to the group that is enacting it, 
and second, within the group enacting justice, there are variations in how justice should be 
enacted. Miller affirmed the need to embrace the relativity of justice by stating, “justice 
takes on different meanings in different practical contexts, and to understand it fully we 
have to grapple with this diversity.”115 
The debate of what justice is or is not has spanned multiple millennia and is far 
beyond the scope of this thesis. This is thesis does, however, define what is justice. Miller 
wrote, “The most plausible candidate for a core definition comes from the Institutes of 
Justinian, a codification of Roman Law from the sixth century AD, where justice is defined 
as ‘the constant and perpetual will to render to each his due.’”116 Justice is best understood 
as a way to resolve interactions among individuals. Furthermore, there must be a resolution 
to that interaction, as in the interaction cannot go on for eternity. For the interaction to end 
without a growing amount of tension, justice must be enacted. A person’s concept of justice 
directly affects a person’s view of the world. It is the rendering each is due that will allow 
for narrative employment by the U.S. government and military to fall within the existing 
discourse of a target audience and allow for influence to take hold. As leadership scholar 
E. Allan Lind and psychologist Tom Tyler affirmed, people care more about justice taking 
place rather than the result of the interaction.117 In other words, people will accept a result 
that may disadvantage them in some way, so long as the process that determined that the 
result was just. Narratives employed by the U.S. government and military must embrace 
this concept. The following section discusses Miller’s analysis of justice as an influence 
component in narrative and the importance of cross-cultural variation of justice.  
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A. WHAT IS JUSTICE? 
Miller breaks justice down into four components: individual claims, an enforceable 
obligation, impartiality, and agency.118 First, justice is about the individual. The individual 
can mean a single person or a single group of people, depending upon the context. What is 
important is, as an individual advances a claim, or is due something, that is in potential 
conflict with another individual, justice is what is relied upon to resolve the claim.119 
Second, “the obligatory nature of justice generally goes hand-in-hand with 
enforceability.”120 In other words, because people expect justice to happen, they place 
obligations on entities that are expected to dispense justice. Ignoring the obligatory nature 
of justice in a narrative is the same as releasing the target audience from any influence that 
the narrative creator may have been had. Simply put, narratives must include justice being 
served when it is apparent to the target audience that it can be enacted. Miller’s third 
component is that the impartiality of justice is “the impartial and consistent application of 
rules.”121 These rules are the rules by which the target audience functions. 
The rules do not have to be in agreement between the U.S. government and military 
and the target audience; however, the rules must be in agreement between the target 
audience and their expectations of justice. A target audience will feel the dissonance of the 
application of justice that always favors the United States’ desired outcomes. The U.S. 
government and military must accept that, within a narrative, there will be situations in 
which the impartiality of justice will not favor the United States; however, it will assist in 
internalizing the narrative for the target audience because it agrees with their construct of 
justice. 
Perhaps one of the essential parts of justice in the narrative is the fourth component: 
agency. For justice to happen, some agent must do something to make it happen. As Miller 
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affirmed, “justice requires an agent whose will alters the circumstance of its objects.”122 
With these four components in mind, we can move to sets of contrasting ideas of justice. 
1. Conservative and Ideal Justice 
There is justice that is served by agreed-upon societal practices, the conservative 
form, and justice that is an ideal form that supersedes societal practices. The narrative 
creator must know when it is appropriate to invoke either of these ideas of justice. Societal 
practices, such as norms and laws, are sharp reflections of a society’s version of justice. 
Miller discussed how justice can only be administered under existing laws and societal 
practices. Therefore, there are no other concepts necessary to drive what is justice and what 
is the absence of justice.123 As Miller wrote, “justice was to be understood as adherence 
to a set of rules that assign physical objects to individuals.”124 The most definitive form of 
justice can assist the narrative creator in understanding how to assign ownership in the 
narrative, even if the narrative creator’s point of view holds a differing concept of justice. 
If person A desires object B under societal rules C, regardless of whether person A deserves 
it or not, justice is being enacted because that society says it is just.125 
On the other hand, there is the notion that justice should take the form in its most 
idealistic fashion and should supersede the rules of society because the rules of society may 
not be enacting justice. Miller wrote, “ideal justice is seen as proposing principles by which 
existing institutions and practices can be assessed, with a view to reform them.”126 The 
narrative creator cannot directly move past society and implement an ideal form of justice 
in the narrative. While the desired outcome may be for a society to accept an ideal form of 
justice, replacing their statutory justice, this must be done with care. The introduction of 
an ideal form of justice that is not already embodied by the target audience may cause the 
audience to ignore the concept because it is just too far from agreement with their internal 
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discourse and thus in conflict with its identity. The United States must understand the type 
of justice it is portraying, whether it is dependent upon the rules of society, what the ideal 
form of justice should be, or a combination of both. This becomes especially important 
when the military plans events or actions to drive the discourse that will influence 
achieving military and policy objectives. 
2. Corrective and Distributive Justice 
Corrective and distributive justice are similar in the sense that they both affect the 
status quo of a narrative, and understanding the differences between the two will help 
influence professionals determine which is the correct notion of justice that is being 
communicated or enacted. Miller wrote, “corrective justice … concerns a bilateral 
relationship between a wrongdoer and his victim, and demands that the fault is canceled 
by restoring the victim … distributive justice … is multilateral: it assumes a distributing 
agent and a number of persons who have claims on what is being distributed.”127 As far as 
narrative development is concerned, the biggest difference between corrective and 
distributive justice is the culpability of character in the narrative. If the distributive justice 
discourse is used, then the narrative’s creator must have objects that are due in the narrative 
distributed in accordance with the societal values. This may happen if there are resources 
that must be shared or divided in a certain way. The narrative creator must be sure not to 
value an individual or a group over another. If the corrective justice discourse is used, then 
the narrative’s creator must be sure the party owes some type of compensation to the other 
and is responsible for the action that initiated the claim. Whereas distributive justice may 
not require a party to be responsible for any claim, corrective justice needs interference 
with another.128 The narrative creator must take care not to misuse and assign 
responsibility when using corrective justice to influence behavior. This is especially so if 
the target audience’s society has not assigned the same amount of culpability to the actor 
in question. As philosopher Aristotle argued, corrective justice is meant to return the parties 
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involved to a state in which they were before the actions that required enacting justice.129 
This notion of equality and status quo may not exist in all societies, and further society-
centric examination should be done when invoking this concept. 
3. Procedural and Substantive Justice 
The next concepts of justice examine whether it is found in the procedure or the 
outcome, and then there is the possibility it is present in both. As previously discussed by 
Lind and Tyler, the justness of the procedure will agree with people more so than the result 
of the procedure.130 Miller examined the difference, stating that while it may be argued, it 
is only the final results of justice that matter, and if the outcome is just, the procedure that 
followed that outcome must be just.131 For the narrative’s creator to be immersed in the 
concept of justice, they must be fluent in the procedures of justice a particular society 
undertakes. This would most certainly include formal and informal procedures of justice. 
Miller continued, when justice is substantive, the procedure that arrived at the justice 
outcome will not be relevant.132 In this sense, the narrative creator may be wasting time 
and resources focusing on the importance of the procedure. 
4. Comparative and Non-comparative Justice 
The final concept of justice is whether justice is comparative or non-comparative. 
Justice is comparative when a holistic view is taken about a claim and those involved in it. 
Per Miller’s example: if persons A, B, and C are all owed 100 dollars each from person D, 
but person D only has 30 dollars, then it would be an exercise in comparative justice if 
person A, B, and C each receive 10 dollars because they will have received their equal 
claim.133 As in the name, comparative justice compares claims against others and the 
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principles of justice society decides to use.134 Non-comparative justice, however, 
considers only the circumstances of each claim for justice.135 Since persons A, B, and C 
are owed 100 dollars each, then they are all entitled to the 100 dollars, and some mechanism 
must be used to fulfill their claims. As political and legal philosopher Joel Feinberg 
discussed, there can be a middle ground between comparative and non-comparative justice, 
and both concepts can be applied in the same instance.136 The narrative creator must 
intimately know their target audience and theories of justice to frame justice to influence 
behavior. Societies can use comparative or non-comparative justice interchangeably, in 
accordance with society’s values and procedures; it is imperative the narrative creator does 
not cause dissonance in the target audience’s mind. 
5. Desert 
As mentioned earlier, this thesis explains what is meant by “what a person is due..” 
A desert,  as philosophers Fred Feldman and Brad Skow wrote, is “the thing that the 
deserver is said to deserve.”137 Political and moral philosopher Serena Olsaretti further 
expanded on what a desert is by stating that a “desert is a three-place relation between a 
person, the grounds on which she is said to be deserving (the desert basis), and the treatment 
or good which she is said to deserve (the deserved good).”138 Feldman and Skow expand 
upon Olsaretti by adding the possibility that there are more than three relations in desert; 
however, the three mentioned are always present.139 As a narrative creator, it is important 
to understand not only does a person have a desert but the circumstances involving that 
desert are affected by values, traditions, and culture since the grounds for the desert varies 
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among peoples. Moreover, it may well be that the person is due something in the narrative 
creator’s eyes but not in the eyes of the target audience’s society. Understanding deserts, 
and how who is due what, should be a central factor in deciding how to create the discourse 
that someone is due something.  
Ideas of justice and what the person is due are certainly separate but intertwined. 
Just as the concepts of justice are relative, so is the concept of desert. This would be 
especially germane if the target audience falls under a justice governing system but does 
not subscribe to it. Then, are their deserts relative to what they believe or what society has 
agreed to? Feldman and Skow affirmed, “A person may be governed by some institution 
even if he does not like it, or does not endorse it.”140 It is at this time where the narrative 
creator must be careful to appeal to the target audience but not alienate potential secondary 
audiences. Nevertheless, understanding what is due is the primary step to the execution of 
justice in the narrative. 
The U.S. government and military must understand how narrative influences 
individuals and societies to act. By understanding justice, a concept that is relevant across 
all narratives and societies, the government and military can improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of its narratives and thus better influence its target audiences. If tensions from 
interactions are resolved accordingly in the narrative, the U.S. government and military 
will become a relevant actor in an individual’s or society’s existence, and thus, policy goals 
and military objectives will be fulfilled. 
B. CROSS-CULTURAL VARIATIONS 
To be a narrative creator who can wield its influence, an acceptance of variation 
and a comfort with relativity, is a skill that cannot be sacrificed. This skill would reign 
especially supreme when crafting a narrative of justice. Nader explained that, “all societies 
we know anything about have accepted ideas as to what is fair or just; ethnocentrism in all 
cultures probably reigns supreme in the area of justice.”141 Variation of concepts justice 
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are not synonymous with being different is right or wrong. Variation means, a further study 
into the history, mode of application, and the context of justice for a particular culture at a 
particular time is needed. Anthropologist Lawrence Rosen remarked, “to point out such 
variations is, however, neither to engage in mindless relativism nor to subvert the use of 
logical analysis.”142 Here, it is important to remember the ultimate goal using narrative is 
to influence and not judge. Rosen explained, “as in any quest for the understanding of 
another culture relativism has never implied giving up one’s own sense of values or 
relinquishing the quest for common elements of human dignity and worth.”143 While it is 
true, a goal may be for a target audience to embody a certain kind of justice, the influencing 
narrative must first be part of a tale in which the target audience members can see 
themselves. Thus, cross-cultural variation and the application of justice are inexorable. 
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IV. IRANIAN NARRATIVES OF JUSTICE 
The IRI is not a monolithic state. Katzman reported on the diversity of the IRI, 
stating, “Iran’s population is about 83 million persons. About 60% is Persian; about 20–
25% is Azeri; about 7% are Kurds; about 4% are Arabs; and about 2% are Baluchis. Iran 
is about 99% Muslim, of which more than 90% are Shiites; about 8% are Sunnis; and 1% 
are Jewish, Christian, Zoroastrian, Baha’i or other.”144 Anthropologist Siamak Naficy 
wrote of the diversity within the IRI by reflecting on Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri’s 
discussion about the contradiction between being Islamic, Iranian, and a Republic by 
offering, “thus, the very name of Islamic Republic of Iran is in conflict with itself revealing 
of its own competing identities.”145 However, if there was one unifying element between 
a large majority of the peoples in Iran it would be Shi’ism. Former IRI president 
Rafsanjani’s advisor  Hooman Majd recounted President Rafsanjani exclaiming to a 
foreign visitor, “If you want to know [Iran], become a Shia first.”146 Majd added, “in order 
to understand Iran and Iranians today, one needs to understand what it meant to shout 
‘Allah-hu-Akbar’ in 1979.”147 As Majd noted, this was not an Islamic fundamentalist 
battle cry as believed in the years following the revolution made infamous by various 
terrorist groups, but were “words [that] signified [Shia Iranians] fearlessness in confronting 
an unjust ruler.”148  
An understanding of Shi’a Islam will open the doors to understanding other aspects 
of Iran. Middle East security scholar Afshon Ostovar added, “Shiism is both a medium of 
expression for the politics championed by the country’s hardliners … and a lens of 
interpretation through which politics writ large are understood. It is a symbol of national 
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identity and a cudgel used against Iran’s enemies.”149 Even though Iran is ethnically and 
culturally diverse, the population’s belief in Shia Islam offers a coalescing factor for 
society. It is a factor in which the IRI’s narrative provides meaning-making and identity 
and goal formation for the Iranian people. An understanding of narratives employed by the 
IRI necessitates an understanding of Shi’a Islam and what is justice in Shi’a Islam. Still, as 
strong as a coalescing factor Shi’a Islam may be, the diversity of Iran means there is not a 
single narrative that will have a universal influence effect on all Iranians. Understanding 
the uniqueness of each target audience remains a paramount task for the narrative creator. 
Just as the IRI is not a monolithic state, the revolution in Iran in 1979 was not a 
monolithic movement. Ostovar noted “pressure against Iran’s ruling monarch, Mohammad 
Reza Shah, was widespread and intense .… Numerous groups championing a host of 
conflicting ideologies were involved in the tumult.”150 Grand Ayatollah Khomeini became 
the lead figure in the revolution, as sociologist Said Arjomand noted “the acclamation of 
Khomeini as Imam by his followers was a startling event in Shi’ite history in Iran. Never 
since the majority of Iranian had become Shi’ite in the sixteenth century had they called 
any living person Imam.”151 Although Grand Ayatollah Khomeini was the most significant 
figure in the revolution, various groups ranging from communists to Islamists all had a part 
to play and their unique interests in overthrowing the shah.152 The understanding that there 
is variation in Iranian society is the understanding that narrative engagement is not a 
singularly focused event. Because an Iranian supported the revolution, that does not make 
them an Islamist, a Khomeinist, or a fundamentalist. Ostovar offered that “what held these 
elements together was shared antipathy for the Shah and a fierce desire for Iran to be free 
from foreign political influence and from the United States in particular.”153 As the 
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revolution succeeded in overthrowing the shah, the new government of the IRI had to find 
a way to govern the country and for the various groups to come together. 
A narrative creator in the U.S. government must weave through and move beyond 
over forty years of anti-American narrative and focus on a conceptual framework, such as 
justice, to begin to wield influence within the IRI. The student takeover of the U.S. embassy 
and the beginning of the hostage crisis happened while the IRI’s government was still 
taking shape. Arjomand revealed that “the taking of the American hostages marked the 
onset of Ayatollah Khomeini’s phantasmagorical struggle with the imperialist Satan.”154 
Arjomand continued by explaining that the anti-American position and calls for vengeance 
against the shah aligned Khomeini with supporters of rival political factions and provided 
him an alternative to his anti-Kurdish and anti-intellectual platform.155 This event, as 
Ostovar noted, gave Ayatollah Khomeini an opportunity to consolidate power in the new 
IRI as other elements in the government resigned in protest. Additionally, the takeover of 
the U.S. embassy secured the role of the United States as an enemy of Iran in the IRI’s 
narrative.156  
This chapter explores Iranian narratives of justice. It  focuses on the major themes 
of justice and injustice that a narrative creator needs to know to be able to conceptualize a 
narrative that has the potential to be accepted and incorporated into the existing narratives 
of the government and people of the IRI. The first section explores pre-Islamic Iran through 
the adaption of Shi’a Islam as the official form of religion. The next section provides a 
general overview of the grievances and injustices claimed by the IRI and how this theme 
serves the IRI’s narrative. Finally, the last section discusses how narrative engagement can 
assist in addressing the previous section. This chapter is not meant to legitimize, apologize, 
or excuse any of the grievances or actions of the IRI. It is, however, meant to serve as a 
conceptual foundation for understanding the narratives of the IRI. 
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A. PRE-ISLAMIC IRAN TO SHI’ISM (1501 AD) 
Iranians may choose to incorporate narratives of pre-Islamic Iran into the narrative 
that makes up who they are. In this sense, recalling Maan, it does not matter if the narrative 
is true or not; it only matters if the people who incorporate it believe it to be true.157 
Therefore, in the scope of this thesis, a brief foray into pre-Islamic Iran is warranted, not 
only to discuss and gain a better understanding the events that shaped meaning-making and 
identities but to start to gain an appreciation for what is Iran. 
Zoroastrianism was founded by the prophet Zoroaster around 600 BC or, as Iran 
scholar Michael Axworthy noted, it could have been much earlier around 1500 BC or 1200 
BC.158 The Zoroastrian new year, Now Ruz, is still celebrated in Iran. Axworthy pointed 
out the role of Zoroastrianism and other traditions that share the supreme deity Ahura 
Mazda (Mazdiasm) as a central figure by stating, “Heaven and hell, free human choice 
between good and evil, divine judgment, angels, a single creator-god, and a Messiah-like 
savior all appear to have been genuine early features of the religion and were all hugely 
influential for religions later to come.”159 Axworthy argued that Mazdiasm could have 
been the first in the region to “address moral and philosophical problems with its theology, 
from an individualistic standpoint that laid emphasis on personal choice and responsibility. 
Zoroaster, in that sense, is said to have invented (or to have revealed) the modern moral 
world.”160 Anthropologist Narges Bajoghli discussed the importance of the pre-Islamic 
era to the Iranian population by noting, “on the establishment of the Islamic Republic, an 
attempt was made to downplay the Iranian holidays that were not Islamic. Citizens, 
however, did not oblige.”161 She also observed that the celebrations of the pre-Islamic 
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holidays “throughout the years have become more elaborate.”162 When examining 
Zoroastrianism in the IRI, influence professionals should not attempt to create a choice 
between believing in Zoroastrianism or Islam. What they should do is discover the 
principles of Zoroastrianism that have survived the test of time and understand how they 
have evolved to be a part of the narratives that are embodied by people who believe in 
them. Then, the skill of influence will not come from changing narratives but using existing 
narratives to change behavior. 
In 549 BC, the Persian Cyrus came to power when he led a revolt against the 
Median Empire. Axworthy noted that Cyrus’s reign was marked by partnership and 
tolerance for the beliefs of the people under his rule. The finding of the Cyrus Cylinder (the 
proclaimed world’s first charter of human rights) in the ruins of Babylon in 1879 reinforced 
modern views of Cyrus’s tolerance and the inclusion of different gods and belief systems 
in his empire.163 Axworthy wrote that “not all [Cyrus’s] successors followed his example 
… but in general Persian rule has a loose devolved style … it is not fanciful to see the 
moral character of that religion [Mazdean] and its emphasis on truth, integrity, and justice 
emerging in its new, firm, but tolerant style of rule.”164  
The Cyrus Cylinder highlights the continuing importance of Iranian ancient history 
to its people. Anthropologist Manuchehr Sanadjian commented that the loaning of the 
Cyrus Cylinder to the IRI from the British was a collective effort between the people of 
Iran and the government of the IRI.165 By bringing the cylinder back into the country, the 
government of the IRI was as Sanadjian explained, “at a variance with the Islamic path 
along which the rulers have been forcefully dragging the Iranian people for three decades 
at considerable human cost. It was nonetheless designed to provide the Islamic rule with a 
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source of power previously beyond its reach.”166 Moreover, as Sanadjian commented, the 
cylinder was used to emphasize the IRI’s assertion of its power and right to rule the country; 
highlighting its right to govern free of international control or influence.167 If the 
government of the IRI thought it was important enough to tap into the narrative of Cyrus 
and pre-Islamic Iran, then to an influence professional and narrative creator, a knowledge 
and further analysis of why this connection remains in the narratives of the people of Iran 
is a necessary task. 
The notion of justice and just rule did not fade. It had withstood multiple conquests, 
rulers, and empires. Axworthy wrote that the Zoroastrian heretic prophet Mazdak in the 
early 500s AD “had created a new social and political settlement, in which the king acted 
as an arbitrator and guarantor between the different social classes, keeping them in balance 
and ensuring justice.”168 Axworthy noted that this form of governance reached its peak 
under from 531 to 579 AD during the reign of Khosraw I Anushirvan.169 As he explained:  
According to this theory of government, success in war showed the favor of 
God and gave the king an aura of royal glory … that showed he had the 
right to rule … if the king ruled justly, his subjects would be prosperous and 
supportive, taxation would be plentiful and his armies strong, defending the 
empire and the king’s own right successfully. But if unjust, the subjects 
would become mutinous and poor, taxation would dwindle … he would also 
lose his battles, and God would give his favor to a usurper. This theoretical 
structure of government, postulated (if never fully achieved) in the last 
flowering of the Sassanid Empire, was reinterpreted later, after the Arab 
conquest (especially in the period of the Abbasid caliphate, after 750 AD) 
was readopted, and dominated ideas about government over the whole 
Islamic world for centuries.170 
Much like Khosraw I’s style of governance has repeated through time, as Axworthy 
pointed out, that even after the Arab conquest of Persia, much of the administration of the 
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empire was handled by Persians.171 Axworthy wrote that “this ability to reassert cultural 
influence—indeed cultural dominance over successive waves of foreign conquerors was 
one aspect of the survival of the Iranian language and culture in the centuries after the 
Islamic conquest.”172 Standing the test of time, Iranian culture, language, and ideas of 
justice are narratives that cannot be ignored. As history is examined, it becomes clearer as 
to why the Iranians share an ingrained resistance to foreign domination. 
In 1501, Shah Esmail of the Safavid Empire declared that Shi’ism would be the 
religion of the empire. In addition to Esmail’s personal belief in Shi’ism, Axworthy wrote 
that he “did this in order to demand a higher level of commitment and allegiance to the 
new monarchy from his subjects and also to make a clear distinction between his empire 
and that of the Ottoman Turks.”173 A further discussion about the differences between 
Shi’a and Sunni Islam is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, it should be one of the 
first steps when an influence professional is given the task to develop narratives designed 
enact influence in the IRI. The next section discusses how narratives of justice serve the 
legitimacy of the IRI. 
B. JUSTICE AS A NARRATIVE FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
Before engaging in narrative in an effort to influence a target audience to behave in 
a way that will assist in the realization of policy goals, the narrative creator must first 
understand and even empathize with the narratives that the target audience already accepts 
as its own. This section explores the narratives put forth by the IRI, particularly focusing 
on the IRI’s conceptions of justice. The IRI’s supreme leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei 
confirmed the importance of justice in the IRI by stating, “justice has been among the 
primary ideals pursued by all prophets, and in the Islamic Republic, it has equal status and 
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value.”174 This thesis does not endorse these narratives as truth, but rather views them as 
truth to the narrator and the narrated. The following is also not meant to be an exhaustive 
list of narratives propagated by the IRI; its intent is to offer enough information to spawn 
further conversation and analysis. 
Grand Ayatollah Khomeini said on January 26, 1979, “While Islam puts an 
emphasis on the resistance against tyrants, it is also equitable and just; and justice means 
don’t be oppressive and don’t give way to oppression.”175 A central narrative in the 
revolution of 1979 and the IRI today is justice. Axworthy noted Grand Ayatollah Khomeini 
argued that velayat-e faqih, or guardianship of the jurist, is justified because 
the real authority to rule belonged to god, or to the Hidden Emam, guided 
by God. In the Emam’s absence the clergy–or rather one supreme cleric, 
Marja, had this right because (1) someone had to rule; (2) human conduct 
had to be governed by shari’a law; therefore (3) the clergy, as those trained 
in the shari’a, were logically the only ones suitable.176 
In other words, just rule is required in the IRI’s system of government. Grand Ayatollah 
Khomeini believed “this system of clerical rule is necessary to prevent injustice: 
corruption, oppression by the powerful over the poor and weak.”177 Ayatollah Khomeini 
also believed that the IRI should be self-reliant and not aligned with Western or Eastern 
powers. When Western or Eastern powers tried to assert their will in the IRI, it is unjust 
and does not respect the IRI basic rights178 For an influence professional planning conduct 
narrative engagement with the IRI or the peoples within, further analysis of Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s narrative is required. The basic thoughts of independence from foreign 
government interference and the incorporation of Islamic values into the government 
structure are themes that cannot be directly negated by its opposite. In other words, a 
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narrative of foreign interference in the affairs of the IRI and removing Islamic values from 
the IRI’s government system will most likely not resonate inside Iran. Even worse, a 
narrative that takes that particular shape will only strengthen the narrative of the injustices 
that the IRI has faced.179 
Beyond Ayatollah Khomeini’s views on international interference within the 
borders of the IRI, there is also the international system’s inability to act that plays into the 
narrative of injustice. IRI public affairs author Fatemeh Mohammadi highlights the non-
action by the United States and the United Nations in response to Iraq’s use of chemical 
weapons in the Iran-Iraq War.180 Linking action to discourse, this was not pure propaganda 
narrative by the IRI. U.S. senior policy analyst Javed Ali confirmed the international 
community’s unwillingness to act against Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.181 Conversely, 
Ali noted, “Iran’s support of terrorist activity against the West, moderate Arab states, and 
against Israel during the 1980s, in addition to its resoundingly militant anti-Western 
rhetoric, effectively dampened its chances for winning overt political support for its cause 
during the war with Iraq.”182 As seen in Mohammadi’s work, despite the United States’ 
political justification for action or no action, the narrative of non-action by the international 
community and the injustices the IRI faced during the Iran-Iraq War are still being 
propagated.183 
The IRI’s supreme leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei continues the discussion of justice 
and injustice in the IRI. Supreme Leader Khamenei addressed the state with a statement 
commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Islamic revolution, which was released on 
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February 11, 2019.184 The focus of the statement was the ideals and actions needed to 
carry on the revolution beyond the next 40 years. His statement offered insight into the 
narrative of the IRI, particularly the themes and importance of justice and injustice. 
Supreme Leader Khamenei wrote, “among all the nations suffering from oppression, few 
make an effort to launch a revolution .…. The auspicious Revolution of the Iranian 
nation—which is the greatest and most popular revolution of the contemporary era—is the 
sole revolution that has persisted forty years of pride, saved from betrayal to its values.”185 
One of the revolution’s values appearing in multiple places in his address is justice.186 
Supreme Leader Khamenei stated that it is possible for everything in the world to have an 
expiration date except the religious revolutionary values because they embody human 
nature. He continued to list the values and noted, “freedom, ethics, spirituality, justice, 
independence, dignity, rationality, brotherhood, are not limited to a single generation or 
generation or society …. It is impossible to imagine a people who despise these values.”187 
Embracing these themes would allow the narrative creator to interweave their narrative 
with the narrative of the IRI. In other words, a narrative that is based on shared values fits 
within the already existing framework of the target audience. Here, the centrality of justice 
would seem like an essential value to start to create a narrative that will resonate with target 
audience. 
For the IRI, a central theme of justice centers around the ability of the government 
to rule independently of another nation’s interests. Naficy offered, “the U.S.-Iran conflict 
is not so much a ‘clash of civilizations’ or competing ideologies as much as a crash of core 
national interests. It involves Iran, a regional power attempting to remove itself from a 
patron-client relationship with the United States, a superpower.”188 Additionally, Supreme 
Leader Khamenei emphasized, “then the revolution of the Iranian nation transformed the 
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bipolar world of that day into a three polar world.”189 Khamenei explained the situation 
as: the world powers did not want to see a nation independent of influence from world 
powers. He continued to note that the world powers would rather see a nation oppressed 
than exercise its freedom, especially if that country’s interest did not align with that of the 
world powers.190 The IRI’s narrative of being the protector of the oppressed continued 
throughout Khamenei’s statement. Bajoghli noted that this narrative has been used since 
the inception of the IRI and invokes the events in Karbala in 680 AD, where the third Shi’a 
Imam, Hussain, was martyred fighting against an oppressive authority.191 While it would 
be difficult for a narrative creator from the U.S. government to defeat the analogy of the 
events of Karbala and the IRI call to fight against oppression, a narrative of justice would 
not attempt to subjugate the people of Iran. A narrative styled as a discussion between equal 
parties with equal standing in the international system will undercut the illusion of 
oppression. 
Supreme Leader Khamenei acknowledged that the IRI does have improvements to 
make in the realm of justice.192 He argued that the IRI government is not content with 
justice in the country. There is room to improve in many areas, such as providing basic 
infrastructure services for remote villages. He went on to state that even though there can 
be improvements to justice in the IRI, the justice that the Iranian people have now is better 
than when Iran was under the shah.193 “Nevertheless,” as part of the importance of justice 
in the IRI’s narrative, Khamenei stated, “the notion of justice as expected by the Islamic 
Republic—that seeks to follow the role model of the government founded by Imam Ali 
(a.s.)—is far superior to that, and I look forward to seeing you, the young people realizing 
it.”194 While Supreme Leader Khamenei charges the youth of the nation to improve the 
justice of the IRI, the U.S. government influence professionals should strive to help sway 
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what types of justice and their implementations could take place in the IRI. Most 
importantly, this engagement cannot happen as a single message to the Iranian youth; it 
must happen over time through many engagements through the use of narrative. 
C. HOW NARRATIVE ENGAGEMENT CAN ASSIST  
Narrative engagement allows the influence professional to have the target audience 
embody narrative(s) in their meaning-making, identity, and goal formation processes.195 
Moreover, narrative engagement is not a singular direction engagement. In other words, it 
is not just about storytelling, it is about listening to the stories of the target audience. 
Johnson noted the importance of repetition of narrative and adjusting the narrative to the 
feedback of the target audience.196 Communication researchers Steven Corman, Angela 
Trethewey, and Bud Goodall wrote that “a meaning cannot simply be transferred, like a 
letter mailed from point A to point B. Instead listeners create meaning from messages based 
on factors like autobiography, history, local context, culture, language/symbol systems, 
power relations, and immediate personal needs.”197 Engagement in narrative is an active 
process, but to begin this active process, there must be engagement between the United 
States and the IRI. Naficy offers that successful engagement means having a conversation 
and not delivering a speech to the target audience.198 Corman, Trethewey, and Goodall 
add that, once communication takes place, repetition does not mean constantly saying the 
same thing over and over. There should be built-in variation to allow the target audience 
to experience the message in different ways to allow for some messages that will not 
resonate with some members.199 The way in which understanding can develop through the 
narrative process is to exchange narratives with a target audience so a better understanding 
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of its reality can be had. In turn, a narrative that has a better chance of influencing can be 
crafted. 
Currently, the U.S. government is attempting to enter the narratives of the IRI and 
the Iranian population. Katzman noted, in 2002, the U.S. government created Radio Farda, 
which broadcasts in Farsi and is a part of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and in 2003, 
Voice of America created a Persian service that provides radio, television, and internet 
media. Also in 2003, the State Department added a Persian language website and in 2011, 
the State Department began Twitter feeds to connect with Iranians.200 Assessing the 
effectiveness of these endeavors is outside the scope of this thesis; however, recognizing 
the need to be able to communicate with the population of Iran was a good first step. This 
thesis recommends that the U.S. government should expand its communication efforts 
through official government channels and develop a diplomatic presence in the IRI so 
narrative between governments and peoples can be exchanged daily. Through narrative 
engagement, the U.S. government and its influence professionals can learn the perspectives 
and motivations that drive the action of the IRI and its people. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A narrative approach offers an influence professional the ability to affect a target 
audience’s behavior by evoking the means by which the target audience understands the 
world around it. This cannot be done without first understanding the narratives in which 
members of the target audience already see themselves. As Johnson argued, crafting 
influential narratives that will cause a target audience to behave in a way that is beneficial 
to the U.S. government’s military objectives and policy goals means first understanding 
the stories of the target audience.201 The importance of narrative in human existence 
cannot be overstated, but with the importance of narrative comes the importance of learning 
about the narratives of a target audience. This learning does not mean a superficial survey 
of narratives; it is a survey of all narratives available to the target audience so it can be 
understood which narratives the target audience selects as its own. A narrative approach is 
tailored and most certainly requires more than one engagement. 
When developing a narrative approach, it is paramount to remember the 
components of a narrative. Recalling Abbott, a narrative consists of two elements: action 
and discourse.202 If the U.S. government is to use narrative to influence the behavior of a 
target audience to take actions that will support its policy objective, then the government 
must be willing to enact the actions that will make that behavior possible. Maan offered 
that discourse without action is not a narrative and it becomes just an assertion about an 
idea. Moreover, ideas do not turn into action until they become a narrative.203 In other 
words, narrative is more than just speaking, it is speaking and doing. 
A. THE VALUE OF THE NARRATIVE APPROACH 
To have target audiences see themselves in narratives that are beneficial to the 
United States, the theme of the narratives should resonate with the target audiences. Justice 
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is the theme, that when communicated and enacted properly, can strike at the identity and 
values of a target audience because it will help the narrative creator resolve tensions created 
by the narratives of human existence. When applied to the IRI, the theme of justice is not 
only a core revolutionary value but also a core value of Islam. Justice allows for a common 
ground to be established between the narratives of the United States and the IRI. Naficy 
offered that interactions, especially diplomatic interactions, rarely are resolved where both 
sides are entirely satisfied on the first go. Instead, Naficy suggested developing “modest 
objectives that help facilitate more constructive interaction can be enormously 
positive.”204 These modest objectives, which can serve as a momentum builder for more 
challenging issues, can and should appeal to calls for justice from both the United States 
and the Islamic Republic because it will allow the governments to function on a common 
playing field. 
As discussed in Chapter II, people have agency in narrative. That means narrative 
acceptance is not a foregone conclusion even in the IRI. Bajoghli discussed how the IRI is 
continuing to debate how to portray itself to its population and keep the support for the 
revolution going from one generation to another.205 She asserted, “the work of messaging 
ideology and defending a revolutionary project to a population is never-ending .… To 
defend that legitimacy, Iran’s military and paramilitary forces continue to pour money into 
this fight.”206 Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen emphasized 
the importance of engaging with the IRI by explaining, “we haven’t had a connection with 
Iran since 1979. Even in the darkest days of … the Cold War we had links to the Soviet 
Union. We are not talking to Iran so we don’t understand each other. If something happens 
… it’s virtually assured that we won’t get it right.”207 Moreover, Naficy offers that, “lack 
of engagement means there will be miscommunication. Miscommunication means there 
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will be misjudgments. Misjudgments means there will be mistakes.”208 Thus, every day 
the United States does not have relations and engagement with the IRI and its population 
means every day it steps closer to losing the conflict of narrative. 
Ultimately, the narrative approach does not entail a clash of narratives that force a 
target audience into a choice as to which narrative to embody. If this is the case, Johnson 
wrote, the target audience will choose the narrative that already fits within its 
understanding of the world. He offered that, once the target audience sees itself within the 
narrative, it can begin to take the actions and understand its role in the narrative.209 Success 
in the narrative approach means using the narratives and conceptual frameworks of a target 
audience so it can see itself within the narratives of the United States. These actions are the 
behaviors that will help achieve both military objectives and policy goals of the U.S. 
government. 
B. NARRATIVE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS, A JOB FOR 
INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
If the utility of narrative is accepted by the U.S. military, then how can narrative 
engagement be executed? Luckily, there is an element within the military that is already 
responsible for integrating, synchronizing, and coordinating information into military 
operations. The information operations officer should be the focal point for planning 
military operations specifically designated to influence a target audience to engage in a 
behavior beneficial to the military commander’s objectives. With the understanding that, 
all operations conducted by the U.S. military will generate multiple narratives. These 
narratives will come from both friendly, neutral, and adversarial sources and need to be 
anticipated and, when appropriate, action should be taken to either suppress or highlight 
these third-party narratives. But there can be another type of military operation, an 
operation specifically designed to have an effect in the cognitive dimension and affect 
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decision making. This operation would be called an “Information Operation” and it should 
fall within the responsibility of the information operations officer to plan and coordinate. 
As the coordinator of the Information Operation, the information operations officer 
would continue to rely on the specialized knowledge of experts within various information-
related capabilities. Being the coordinator of the operations ensures that all the available 
information-related capabilities are utilized to their fullest potential and the effects are 
being achieved and assessed. In other words, the information operations officer can 
maintain an overarching view while the information-related capabilities experts are 
executing their specific tasks. The advent of an Information Operation allows the military 
to deliberately participate in the contest for space in the information environment. Thus, 
creating narrative will enable the U.S. military to influence a target audience to engage in 
behavior that will be advantageous to the military commander’s objectives and the U.S. 
government’s policy goals. 
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